Pramod Kumar Navratna vs State of Chhattisgarh 2026 INSC 124 - Rape - Promise To Marry - Marital Status Of Victim
Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 375,376 - The complainant was herself a married woman with a subsisting marriage and a child -Quashing FIR - SC held: Both parties were aware about the marital status of the victim and therefore it cannot be, by any stretch imagination said that the consent of the complainant has been vitiated or obtained on fraud and misrepresentation made by the accused- such a promise would not be legally enforceable or even capable of being acted upon as the victim herself was not eligible for marriage, neither on the date of the first alleged act of offence nor on any subsequent dates wherein the parties indulged in the sexual activities, till the point of the date of registration of FIR.
Hindu Marriage Act,1955 - Section 5 ; Special Marriage Act, 1954 - Section 4 - The law prohibits bigamous unions and therefore disallows parties from entering into a second marriage during the subsistence of their first marriage. (Para 19-20)
Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 376(2)(n): Essential ingredients to constitute the said offence i.e. there should be a promise of marriage made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations and without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations. Such genuine cases that deserve prosecution of the accused must be clearly demarcated from the litigation that arises from the cases of consensual relationships between consenting adults going acrimonious on account of dispute and disagreement or a future change of mind - The expression “repeatedly” contemplates more than one act of sexual assault, committed at different points in time on the same victim - This means a series of acts that are separate in nature and not a continuation of a single transaction. In genuine cases under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, the pattern is usually unmistakable; it is an initial act of sexual assault, followed by multiple acts under fear, pressure, captivity, or continued deceit, often when the woman is rendered vulnerable and unable to escape the situation. (Para 16)
the law prohibits bigamous unions and therefore disallows parties from entering into a second marriage during the subsistence of their first marriage.
Case Info
Basic Case Details
Case name and neutral citation:Pramod Kumar Navratna vs State of Chhattisgarh & Others, 2026 INSC 124 (NON‑REPORTABLE)
Coram:B.V. Nagarathna, J. and Ujjal Bhuyan, J.
Judgment date:5 February 2026 (New Delhi)
Case laws and citations referred
- Naim Ahamed vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385
- Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398
- Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764
- Samadhan vs. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528
- State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
Statutes / laws referred
- Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 375 and 376(2)(n)
- Constitution of India – Article 226
- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 5(i) and Section 13(1)(ia)
- Special Marriage Act, 1954 – Section 4(i)
- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Sections 183 and 192
- (Old) Code of Criminal Procedure context via reference to inherent powers / anticipatory bail (Section 482 equivalent mentioned as “under Section 482 of BNSS”)
Brief summary (three sentences)
The Supreme Court held that the FIR and prosecution under Section 376(2)(n) IPC, based on alleged repeated rape on a false promise of marriage, arose from a consensual relationship between two advocates, where the complainant was herself a married woman with a subsisting marriage and a child. The Court reasoned that a promise of marriage to a person not legally eligible to marry (due to an existing marriage) cannot vitiate consent, and that the facts did not disclose the essential ingredients of rape on a false pretext of marriage, but rather reflected a consensual relationship gone sour. Applying the principles in Bhajan Lal and earlier “false promise to marry” cases, the Court quashed the FIR, chargesheet and Sessions Case No. 89/2025, setting aside the High Court’s refusal to quash.
