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Hindu Succession Act

Manjula and Others v. D.A. Srinivas 2026 INSC 465 - S.25 Hindu Succession Act - Benami Prohibition

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Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - Section 25 - The bar under Section 25 applies to both intestate and testamentary succession. A person accused of the murder of one from whom inheritance is claimed, is disentitled from asserting rights, not only under Section 25 but also on the principles of justice, fair play and equity. (Para 29-v) The disqualification operates against a person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder. The provision does not make conviction a condition precedent. The provision imposes a civil consequence against a wrongdoer and the issue may be examined on the standard of preponderance of probabilities, independent of the strict standard of proof applicable to criminal prosecution. (Para 25.10) The expression “murder” occurring in Section 25 would include culpable homicide. (Para 25.11)

Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016.- The 2016 amendments, insofar as they are declaratory, procedural, curative and machinery-oriented, operate retrospectively / retroactively, while penal provisions creating new offences or enhancing punishment can operate only prospectively. (Para 22.15)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order VII Rule 11 -An application under Order VII Rule 11 can be taken up along with a preliminary objection and decided together by the trial Court - Admission of a plaint is not automatic; Trial Courts shall verify whether the plaint satisfies the requirements of Order VII Rule 11 CPC before issuing summons. However, merely because the plaint has been admitted and summons issued, the defendants are not precluded from seeking rejection of the plaint or raising a preliminary objection; A disputed question of fact requiring the adducing and appreciation of evidence cannot ordinarily be decided as a preliminary objection or while considering an application for rejection of plaint. However, this does not preclude the Court from examining whether the very basis of such question is legally sustainable before relegating the parties to the ordeal of trial. Courts below must curtail frivolous suits which are barred by law, and cases where the cause of action disclosed is illusory, by piercing the veil of clever drafting and giving a meaningful and wholesome reading to the plaint and accompanying documents, preferably at the earliest stage of the suit. (Para 29) The plaint can be rejected for failure to produce documents relied upon or referred to in the plaint. (Para 9.4)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order VII Rule 11 -Once the plaint is presented for institution, and before it is admitted, it is the duty of the trial Court to verify the contents of the plaint and ensure that all legal requirements are satisfied before admitting the plaint. A trial Court cannot mechanically admit the plaint and register the suit. Admission of the plaint cannot be a mechanical process by which the note of the Registry is merely endorsed by the Court. If, at the stage of admission of the plaint, the trial Court, upon a meaningful reading of the plaint, comes to the conclusion that the plaint is liable to be rejected, it shall reject the plaint. It is not necessary for the trial Court to wait for the defendant to enter appearance and seek rejection of the plaint. Once the Court finds that the suit is frivolous, without jurisdiction, instituted without compliance with prerequisites, fails to disclose a real cause of action, suppresses material facts, or is barred by law but couched in clever drafting to create an illusion of a cause of action, it must reject the plaint with costs. (Para 9.3)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order VII Rule 11 - Material facts are those facts which create a complete cause of action; those facts which directly bear upon the maintainability or sustainability of the suit; and those facts upon adjudication of which may bring an end to the lis. Any suppression of a material fact, which has the effect of creating an illusory cause of action and eclipsing the legal bar, ought to be dealt with firmly, and the plaint would be liable to be summarily rejected. It is also settled law that a person who has suppressed a material fact is not entitled to any relief. Suppression of a material fact within the knowledge of the party amounts to fraud upon the Court. The relevancy or otherwise of a fact is to be decided by the Court, and parties cannot contend that they omitted a material fact on the assumption that it was not relevant. It is not only the duty of the Court to summarily reject the claim of a party suppressing a material fact, but also to ensure that any benefit obtained by such party is undone and status quo ante restored in its fairness and equity.  (Para 9.5)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order VII Rule 13 - The rejection of the plaint does not preclude the plaintiff from preventing a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action. Rule 13 can ordinarily be invoked only when the plaint has been rejected for non-disclosure of cause of action or curable defects. There is a distinction between “having” a cause of action and “disclosing” a cause of action. As noticed above, a plaint can be rejected if it fails to disclose a cause of action upon a meaningful reading. All that Rule 13 permits is, where the right to sue survives after rejection of the plaint on the ground of non-disclosure of cause of action, a fresh plaint may be presented. However, when the suit itself is barred by law, Rule 13 cannot come to the rescue of the plaintiff. Similarly, what is enabled is only presentation of a fresh plaint; it does not mandate automatic admission of the plaint or registration of the suit. The plaintiff must still establish compliance with all legal requirements, including the law of limitation. (Para 9.7)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order VII Rule 11 and Order XIV Rule 2 -These are distinct procedural mechanisms, both are designed to prevent unnecessary trials in cases where the suit is barred in law. The former operates where the defect is evident on the 52 face of the plaint; the latter applies where a pure question of law arises upon admitted or undisputed foundational facts after pleadings are complete. Proper invocation of either provision advances procedural economy, curbs abuse of process, and would promote timely administration of justice as it is the duty of the Courts to weed out frivolous suits.  (Para 10.7)

Interpretation of Statutes - Every statute is presumed to be prospective unless the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides otherwise - The mere fact that a law is brought into force from a particular date does not necessarily mean that it operates only prospectively. To determine the true temporal operation of a statute, the object of the enactment must be considered. If the purpose of the amendment is to cure a defect, remove an omission, substitute appropriate provisions earlier lacking, effectively implement the original legislative intent, or if the amendment is clarificatory, declaratory or validating in nature, it may legitimately receive retrospective operation. Protection against retrospectivity generally extends only to vested or accrued rights. (Para 22.2-3)

Interpretation of Statutes - Ordinarily, where the legislature employs the word “includes”, the definition is prima facie extensive and enlarging. Where the word “means” alone is used, the definition is generally exhaustive. Where the expression “means and includes” is employed, the definition is ordinarily exhaustive while also clarifying its scope. However, even where only the word “includes” is used, 115 the context, object of the statute, and the structure of the provision may indicate a restrictive or exhaustive intention.  (Para 23.2)

Manjula and Others v. D.A. Srinivas 2026 INSC 465 - S.25 Hindu Succession Act - Benami Prohibiti
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Manjula & Ors. v. D.A. Srinivas — 2026 INSC 465

1. What This Case is About & Outcome

D.A. Srinivas (the plaintiff/respondent) claimed ownership of agricultural land in Karnataka's Bengaluru Rural District by relying on a Will allegedly executed by one K. Raghunath in 2018. His case was that he had provided the money to buy the land but had it registered in Raghunath's name (due to restrictions under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act preventing him from buying agricultural land directly), and that Raghunath then made a Will bequeathing the land back to him. Raghunath's widow and children (Manjula and others — the defendants/appellants) disputed this entirely, arguing the land belonged to Raghunath, that a separate earlier Will bequeathed it to the wife, and that the plaintiff is in fact the prime accused in Raghunath's murder.

The trial court had thrown out Srinivas's lawsuit at the very first stage — before any trial — finding that the plaint itself revealed the transaction was a prohibited "benami" arrangement (property held in another's name) barred under the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988. The Karnataka High Court reversed that order and sent the case back for trial. The Supreme Court has now reversed the High Court, restored the trial court's order, and rejected the plaint — meaning the suit has been dismissed at the threshold without a full trial.

2. Key Legal Questions Decided

a) When can a plaint be rejected at the threshold (Order VII Rule 11 CPC)? The core procedural question was whether a court can dismiss a lawsuit before trial merely by reading the plaint. The Court reaffirmed that the answer is yes — if a meaningful, substantive reading of the plaint (including documents annexed to it) shows the suit is barred by law or discloses no real cause of action, the court must reject it. Clever drafting that creates an "illusion" of a cause of action does not save the plaint.

b) Did the plaint reveal a benami transaction barred under the Benami Act? Although the plaintiff never used the word "benami," the Court held that the substance of his own pleadings — that he funded the purchase but registered it in Raghunath's name due to statutory restrictions — squarely describes a benami transaction within the definition under Section 2(9) of the Act. Courts are not limited to the label used; they must look at the substance.

c) Did the fiduciary relationship exception apply? The Benami Act exempts arrangements where property is held in a "fiduciary capacity." The plaintiff argued Raghunath was akin to a trusted agent/employee and therefore the transaction was exempt. The Court rejected this: an ordinary employer-employee relationship is not a fiduciary one in the legal sense. Moreover, the plaintiff had not even pleaded fiduciary relationship in the plaint itself, so he could not raise it for the first time in argument.

d) Does the Benami Act apply to a claim based on a Will? The plaintiff argued that since his suit was based on a Will (a testamentary document), not on the original purchase transaction, the Benami Act's prohibitions did not apply. The Court rejected this as a transparent attempt to dress up an enforcement of a benami claim in testamentary clothing. The Will itself was merely the mechanism used to attempt to recover the benami property.

e) Bar under the Hindu Succession Act (murder of the testator)? The Court also noted that Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 bars a person who commits murder from inheriting from the victim. Since Srinivas stands accused of Raghunath's murder (and was in custody at the time of the judgment on forgery-related charges), this was an additional ground disqualifying him from claiming under the Will.

3. Notable Reasoning & Principles Laid Down

  • "Meaningful reading" over "formal reading": Courts must not passively accept a plaint's surface claims. The true character of the transaction, gleaned from the plaint as a whole and its attached documents, is what matters. If clever drafting veils a statutory bar, the court must lift that veil.
  • Substance over form in benami cases: The absence of the word "benami" in a plaint does not save it if the factual averments disclose a benami arrangement. A plaintiff who pleads that he funded a purchase in another's name is, in substance, pleading a benami transaction, regardless of how the claim is later framed.
  • Fiduciary relationship requires more than trust or employment: The Court undertook an extensive analysis of "fiduciary capacity" under the Benami Act. To attract the exception, there must be a legally recognised relationship of entrustment, loyalty, and duty — such as trustee-beneficiary, principal-agent, or analogous relationships. A routine employer-employee relationship does not qualify, and the relationship must also be pleaded in the plaint.
  • A murderer cannot inherit: The Court gave effect to the principle that a person accused of, and criminally charged with, the murder of a testator cannot inherit under that testator's Will. This is both a statutory bar (Section 25, Hindu Succession Act) and a general principle of public policy — no one should profit from their own wrong.
  • Courts as active gatekeepers: The judgment contains an unusually strong passage on the duty of trial courts to screen plaints actively at admission stage — not to rubber-stamp their registration. Courts must detect and reject fictitious, frivolous, or legally barred suits early, and must impose costs to deter abuse of process.
  • Interplay of Order VII Rule 11 and Order XIV Rule 2 CPC: The Court clarifies the distinction between rejecting a plaint at the threshold (where the bar is apparent on the face of the plaint) and deciding a preliminary legal issue after pleadings are complete. Both mechanisms serve the goal of preventing unnecessary trials.

Case Info

Case name: Manjula and Others v. D.A. Srinivas

Neutral citation: 2026 INSC 465

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr. Justice R. Mahadevan

Judgment date: 8 May 2026


Case laws and citations referred


Some of the principal decisions cited (with citations as in the judgment):

  • T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and another, (1977) 4 SCC 467
  • Valliammal (D) by LRs v. Subramaniam and others, (2004) 7 SCC 233
  • K. Akbar Ali v. K. Umar Khan and others, (2021) 14 SCC 51
  • Sree Surya Developers & Promoters v. N. Sailesh Prasad and others, (2022) 5 SCC 736
  • Ramisetty Venkatanna and another v. Nasyam Jamal Saheb and others, (2024) 18 SCC 426
  • Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I and another, (2004) 9 SCC 512
  • Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510
  • P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy and others, (2015) 8 SCC 331
  • Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia and others, 2025 INSC 77
  • Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, (2020) 7 SCC 366
  • State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, (1991) 4 SCC 1
  • Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137
  • Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede and Company, (2007) 5 SCC 614
  • Madanuri Sri Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174
  • R.K. Roja v. U.S. Rayudu, (2016) 14 SCC 275
  • Srihari Hanumandas Totala v. Hemant Vithal Kamat, (2021) 9 SCC 99
  • Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties, (2020) 6 SCC 557
  • Sukhbiri Devi v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1322
  • Union of India v. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., (2023) 3 SCC 315 (noting later recall: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2981)
  • Assistant Collector of Customs v. L.R. Melwani, AIR 1970 SC 962
  • Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 940
  • Illias v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1970 SC 1065
  • Divisional Forest Officer v. G.V. Sudhakar Rao, (1985) 4 SCC 573
  • State of M.P. v. Kallo Bai, (2017) 14 SCC 502
  • Radhika Aggarwal v. Union of India, (2025) 6 SCC 545
  • Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, (1989) 2 SCC 95
  • R. Rajagopal Reddy v. Padmini Chandrasekharan, (1995) 2 SCC 630
  • Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1955) 1 SCC 76
  • Zile Singh v. State of Haryana, (2004) 8 SCC 1
  • CIT v. Gold Coin Health Food (P) Ltd., (2008) 9 SCC 622
  • CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 1
  • Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss ARC, (2021) 9 SCC 657
  • Marcel Martins v. M. Printer, (2012) 5 SCC 342
  • Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad, (2005) 11 SCC 314
  • K.D. Sharma v. SAIL, (2008) 12 SCC 481
  • Dalip Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 2 SCC 114
  • Union of India v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav, (1996) 4 SCC 127
  • Binod Pathak v. Shankar Choudhary, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1411
  • Several Privy Council / Federal Court / HC decisions on benami, fiduciary capacity, suppression, and succession (e.g. Musammat Bilas Kunwar, Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh, N. Ramaiah v. Nagaraj S.).

Statutes and provisions referred


Key statutes and provisions discussed:

  • Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order VII Rule 11, Order XIV Rule 2, Order IV, Order V, Order VI, Order IX, Sections 26, 27, 35A, 148, 149, 151.
  • Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 (original and as amended in 2016), especially:
    • Section 2(8), 2(9), 2(10), 2(12), 2(19), 2(26), 2(29)
    • Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 18–23, 24–29, 40, 45, 46, 49, 50–52, 53, 54, 55, 55A, 60, 61, 62, 65–68.
  • Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016.
  • Hindu Succession Act, 1956: Sections 5, 25, 27, 30.
  • Indian Succession Act, 1925 (Part VI on wills).
  • Indian Contract Act, 1872: Sections 10, 23.
  • Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961: Sections 79A, 79B.
  • Transfer of Property Act, 1882: Section 53, Section 53A.
  • Indian Trusts Act, 1882: earlier Sections 81, 82, 84, 94 (as context to pre‑1988 benami law).
  • Income-tax Act, 1961: Section 281A; also used as reference statute for “authorities”.
  • Companies Act, 2013: Section 166 (director’s fiduciary duties, by analogy).
  • Indian Penal Code, 1860: Sections 193, 228; concept of “murder”/culpable homicide in reading Section 25 HSA.
  • Code of Criminal Procedure / BNSS: Sections 173 CrPC, 345–346 CrPC (by reference), Articles 20(1) & 20(2) of the Constitution (for retrospectivity and double jeopardy).

Brief summary (three sentences)


The Supreme Court holds that the suit filed by the plaintiff, claiming title to properties through a 2018 will and asserting that he funded the purchases in the deceased’s name, is in substance an attempt to enforce a benami arrangement barred by the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, and therefore the plaint must be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. It further rules that the 2016 amendments to the Benami Act are retrospective in their procedural, curative and confiscatory aspects, that no “fiduciary” exemption applies to a purely employer–employee / commercial MOU arrangement, and that contracts structured to evade land‑reform restrictions are void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. Setting aside the Karnataka High Court’s order, the Court not only restores the trial court’s rejection of the plaint but also declares the transactions benami and directs the Central Government to appoint an Administrator and confiscate the suit properties.