CaseCiter Daily Digest

Union Of India vs Gaming Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 2025 INSC 181 - Lottery
Constitution of India - The expression “lottery” takes its meaning from “betting and gambling”. Although a lottery ticket is nothing but an actionable claim, the conduct of a lottery scheme is nothing but a betting and gambling activity. Therefore, it is only Entry 62 – List II which enables the imposition of tax by the State Government. The activity of betting and gambling which includes conducting of a lottery is regulated under Entry 34 – List II, with Entry 62 – List II being the taxation entry. (Para 18.4)
Constitution of India - Article 32,226, 248 - If a Central Act is challenged as being beyond the legislative competence of Parliament, it is enough to enquire if it is a law with respect to matters or taxes enumerated in List II. If it is not, no further question arises. Thus, the wide words of a substantive Article like Article 248 should be given full effect and they cannot be cut down by the wording in the Lists in Schedule VII merely because certain known taxes have not been included therein (Para 11.8)
Contract Law - Agency - The mere fact that a person does something in order to benefit another and the latter is relying on the former to do so or may have requested or even contracted for performance of the action, does not make the former the agent of the latter. The centrality to agency is the conferral of authority to alter legal relations; as such in common law, being an agent is not a status but a description of a person, while and only so long as the person is exercising such authority. Thus, where one person (the principal), requests or authorises the other (agent), to act on his behalf and the other agrees to do so, the law recognises that such agent has power to affect the principal’s legal position by acts which, though performed by the agent, are to be treated in certain respects as if they were acts of the principal. It is common to regard control by the principal as a defining characteristic of agency. Thus, agency is termed as acting on behalf of the principal and subject to principal’s control. (Para 15.3) Lotteries - There is no promotion of the business of the State which conducts lotteries as an agent. Consequently, there is no principal- agent relationship, rather it is one of principal to principal. (Para 17.5)
Naushey Ali vs State of U.P. 2025 INSC 182- S 482 CrPC - S 307 IPC - Attempt To Murder Cases - Quashing On Settlement
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 482 - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 307 - Will the mere mention of Section 307 IPC in the criminal proceedings force the court to adopt a hands-off approach, when parties come forward with a settlement? Mere mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge-sheet should not be the basis for adopting a hands-off approach. It has further held that it would be open for the court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or whether there is evidence to back it. (Para 9-12)
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 320, 482 - Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. (Para 6)
Om Prakash Gupta Alias Lalloowa (D) vs Satish Chandra (D) 2025 INSC 183 - Order XXII Rule 1,4 CPC - Abatement - Substitution - Limitation
Code of Civil Procedure 1908- Order XXII Rule 1 - Limitation Act 1963 - Article 120,121 -The total time-frame for filing an application for substitution and for setting aside abatement, as outlined in Articles 120 and 121 of the Limitation Act, is 150 (90 + 60) days. The question of condonation of delay, through an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, arises only after this period and not on the 91st day when the suit/appeal abates- The proper sequence to be followed, therefore, is an application for substitution within 90 days of death and if not filed, to file an application for setting aside the abatement within 60 days and if that too is not filed, to file the requisite applications for substitution and setting aside the abatement with an accompanying application for condonation of delay in filing the latter application, i.e., the application for setting aside the abatement. Once the court is satisfied that sufficient cause prevented the plaintiff/appellant from applying for setting aside the abatement within the period of limitation and orders accordingly, comes the question of setting the abatement. That happens as a matter of course and following the order for substitution of the deceased defendant/respondent, the suit/appeal regains its earlier position and would proceed for a trial/hearing on merits. (Para 11 )
Code of Civil Procedure 1908-Order XXII Rule 4 - The law not having expressly mandated that an application for substitution has to be filed by the plaintiff/appellant upon receiving intimation of death, requiring a formal application from the plaintiff only will serve no tangible purpose. (Para 19) When an application praying for substitution had been made, then, even assuming that it does not have an explicit prayer for setting aside the abatement, such prayer could be read as inherent in the prayer for substitution in the interest of justice. (Para 23)
Code of Civil Procedure 1908- Order XXII Rule 10A - Rule 10A casts a duty upon a pleader appearing for a party to the suit to intimate the court about the death of such party. It further provides that once the court is informed by the pleader of a party that he is no more, the court “shall” notify the opposing party of the death. A straightforward interpretation of this rule would suggest that the court's obligation to issue notice to the other party is indeed mandatory. Nonetheless, this obligation may not arise in all circumstances. One notable exception could be when the information regarding the party's death is conveyed to the court in the presence of the opposing party's pleader or is documented by the court in the order sheet. In such cases, if the pleader of the concerned party (and consequently the party itself) has already been notified, issuing a further notice from the court would not serve any substantial purpose other than being an exercise by way of abundant caution. Therefore, in the aforementioned scenario, the absence of a notice from the court would not imply a failure to comply with Rule 10A, suggesting that it is not “always mandatory”. (Para 29)
Constitution of India - Article 136 - There is no bar for the Supreme Court to erase defective orders by setting them aside, even in the absence of any challenge thereto. (Para 21)
Canara Bank vs Ajithkumar G.K. 2025 INSC 184 - Compassionate Appointment
Compassionate Appointment - The underlying idea behind compassionate appointment in death-in-harness cases appears to be that the premature and unexpected passing away of the employee, who was the only bread earner for the family, leaves the family members in such penurious condition that but for an appointment on compassionate ground, they may not survive. There cannot be a straitjacket formula applicable uniformly to all cases of employees dying-in-harness which would warrant appointment on compassionate grounds. Each case has its own peculiar features and is required to be dealt with bearing in mind the financial condition of the family. It is only in “hand-to-mouth” cases that a claim for compassionate appointment ought to be considered and granted, if at all other conditions are satisfied. Such “hand-to-mouth” cases would include cases where the family of the deceased is ‘below poverty line’ and struggling to pay basic expenses such as food, rent, utilities, etc., arising out of lack of any steady source of sustenance. This has to be distinguished from a mere fall in standard of life arising out of the death of the bread earner. (Para 29)
Compassionate appointment - Lapse of time could, however, be a major factor for denying compassionate appointment where the claim is lodged belatedly. A presumption is legitimately drawn in cases of claims lodged belatedly that the family of the deceased/incapacitated employee is not in immediate need of financial assistance. However, what would be a reasonable time would largely depend on the policy/scheme for compassionate appointment under consideration. If any time limit has been prescribed for making an application and the claimant applies within such period, lapse of time cannot be assigned as a ground for rejection. (Para 27) Principles discussed: a) Appointment on compassionate ground, which is offered on humanitarian grounds, is an exception to the rule of equality in the matter of public employment b) Compassionate appointment cannot be made in the absence of rules or instructions c) Compassionate appointment is ordinarily offered in two contingencies carved out as exceptions to the general rule, viz. to meet the sudden crisis occurring in a family either on account of death or of medical invalidation of the breadwinner while in service d) The whole object of granting compassionate employment by an employer being intended to enable the family members of a deceased or an incapacitated employee to tide over the sudden financial crisis, appointments on compassionate ground should be made immediately to redeem the family in distress e) Since rules relating to compassionate appointment permit a side- door entry, the same have to be given strict interpretation f) Compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right and the criteria laid down in the Rules must be satisfied by all aspirants g) None can claim compassionate appointment by way of inheritance h) Appointment based solely on descent is inimical to our constitutional scheme, and being an exception, the scheme has to be strictly construed and confined only to the purpose it seeks to achieve i) None can claim compassionate appointment, on the occurrence of death/medical incapacitation of the concerned employee (the sole bread earner of the family), as if it were a vested right, and any appointment without considering the financial condition of the family of the deceased is legally impermissible j) An application for compassionate appointment has to be made immediately upon death/incapacitation and in any case within a reasonable period thereof or else a presumption could be drawn that the family of the deceased/incapacitated employee is not in immediate need of financial assistance. Such appointment not being a vested right, the right to apply cannot be exercised at any time in future and it cannot be offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over k) The object of compassionate employment is not to give a member of a family of the deceased employee a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. Offering compassionate employment as a matter of course irrespective of the financial condition of the family of the deceased and making compassionate appointments in posts above Class III and IV is legally impermissible l) Indigence of the dependents of the deceased employee is the first precondition to bring the case under the scheme of compassionate appointment. If the element of indigence and the need to provide immediate assistance for relief from financial destitution is taken away from compassionate appointment, it would turn out to be a reservation in favour of the dependents of the employee who died while in service which would directly be in conflict with the ideal of equality guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution m)The idea of compassionate appointment is not to provide for endless compassionn) Satisfaction that the family members have been facing financial distress and that an appointment on compassionate ground may assist them to tide over such distress is not enough; the dependent must fulfil the eligibility criteria for such appointment o) There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the applicant becomes a major after a number of years, unless there are some specific provisions p) Grant of family pension or payment of terminal benefits cannot be treated as substitute for providing employment assistance. Also, it is only in rare cases and that too if provided by the scheme for compassionate appointment and not otherwise, that a dependent who was a minor on the date of death/incapacitation, can be considered for appointment upon attaining majority q) An appointment on compassionate ground made many years after the death/incapacitation of the employee or without due consideration of the financial resources available to the dependent of the deceased/incapacitated employee would be directly in conflict with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution r) Dependents if gainfully employed cannot be considered s) The retiral benefits received by the heirs of the deceased employee are to be taken into consideration to determine if the family of the deceased is left in penury. The court cannot dilute the criterion of penury to one of “not very well-to-do” t) Financial condition of the family of the deceased employee, allegedly in distress or penury, has to be evaluated or else the object of the scheme would stand defeated inasmuch as in such an eventuality, any and every dependent of an employee dying-in- harness would claim employment as if public employment is heritable u) The terminal benefits, investments, monthly family income including the family pension and income of family from other sources, viz. agricultural land were rightly taken into consideration by the authority to decide whether the family is living in penury. v) The benefits received by widow of deceased employee under Family Benefit Scheme assuring monthly payment cannot stand in her way for compassionate appointment. Family Benefit Scheme cannot be equated with benefits of compassionate appointment. w) The fixation of an income slab is, in fact, a measure which dilutes the element of arbitrariness. While, undoubtedly, the facts of each individual case have to be borne in mind in taking a decision, the fixation of an income slab subserves the purpose of bringing objectivity and uniformity in the process of decision making x) Courts cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic consideration y) Courts cannot allow compassionate appointment dehors the statutory regulations/instructions. Hardship of the candidate does not entitle him to appointment dehors such regulations/instructions z) An employer cannot be compelled to make an appointment on compassionate ground contrary to its policy. (Para 11)
Practice and Procedure -Power of an appellate court is circumscribed by laws. Unless a particular case in appeal is so exceptional in nature that the appellate court considers it imperative to exercise power akin to power conferred on appellate courts by Order XLI Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code, such power should normally not be exercised. (Para 36)
Precedents - Even an obiter dictum of Supreme Court could be binding on the high courts (Para 39) - So long the decision that is doubted is overruled, it continues to remain binding. (Para 47)
Practice and Procedure - The relief that the suitor is entitled in law could still be denied in equity on account of subsequent and intervening events, i.e., events between the date of commencement of the litigation and the date of the decision; however, such relief may not be denied solely on account of time lost in prosecuting proceedings in judicial or quasi-judicial forum for no fault of the suitor- It would, therefore, not be prudent or wise to reject a claim only because of the time taken by the court(s) to decide the issue before it. (Para 26)
Akula Raghuram vs State Of Andhra Pradesh 2025 INSC 185 - S 366A IPC - Acquitted
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 366A - Accused's appeal against concurrent conviction - Allowing appeal, SC observed; that Even if there is a consent, the accused cannot be absolved of a criminal liability if the child is a minor -Radiologist certifying her age to be between 16 to 17 years - Even in the case of ossification test, there could be a difference of two years, either way and in that circumstance, the age determination by the doctor as between 16 to 17 years does not conclusively establish that the victim was a minor child at the time of the alleged abduction- Radiologist was neither examined nor was the his report marked in evidence.
Vijayalaxmi @ Roopa V. Shenoy vs National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2025 INSC 186 - Motor Accident Compensation
Motor Accident Compensation - The determination of income must proceed on the basis of Income Tax Return when available, being a statutory document. (Para 7)
State Of Uttarakhand vs Sanjay Ram Tamta @ Sanju @ Prem Prakash 2025 INSC 187 - S 304B IPC - Dowry Death - S 378 CrPC
Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 304B -Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 113B - Section 304B of the I.P.C. presupposes several factors for its applicability, which are; (i) the death of a woman caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (ii) such death having occurred within seven years from the date of the marriage; (iii) soon before her death, the woman having been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband and (iv) such cruelty or harassment being in connection with the demand of dowry. It was, categorically held that if one of the ingredients is absent, the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act would not be available to the prosecution. (Para 8)
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 378 - Appellate Courts would be slow in reversing an order of acquittal, especially since the presumption of innocence that is always available to the accused; as a basic principle of criminal jurisprudence, stands reinforced and reaffirmed by the acquittal and unless there are very substantive and compelling reasons to do so, there cannot be a reversal of an order of acquittal. Unless it is found that the findings are perverse and the only conclusion possible from the compelling evidence is of guilt; Appellate Courts will be slow to reverse an order of acquittal. (Para 5)
Sanjay Rajpoot vs Ram Singh 2025 INSC 188 - Motor Accident Compensation
Motor Accident Compensation - When age at the time of the incident is 22 years of age, the multiplier to be applied is 18. (Para 11)
Digvijay Laxhamsinh Gaekwad (Danny Gaekwad) vs Sapna Govind Rao 2025 INSC 189 - SEBI Regulations
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011 - Regulation 20 - No legal aspect involved in this order.
Narcotic Control Bureau vs Lakhwinder Singh 2025 INSC 190 - NDPS Act - Bail - Appellate Court
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 37 - Appellate Court is bound by constraints of Section 37 of the NDPS Act while considering the prayer for the grant of bail during the pendency of an appeal. However, if, in the facts of the case, an accused has undergone a substantial part of the substantive sentence and, considering the pendency of criminal appeals, his appeal is not likely to be heard before the accused undergoes the entire sentence, the Appellate Court can exercise the power of releasing the accused on bail pending the appeal. If the relief of bail is denied in such a factual situation only on the grounds of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, it will amount to the violation of the rights of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India- If a case is made out for the grant of suspension of sentence and/or bail in deserving cases on merits, the Court is not powerless to grant relief of suspension of sentence and bail pending an appeal, even if an accused has not undergone half of the sentence. There cannot be a rule of thumb that a convict cannot be released on bail pending an appeal against conviction unless he has undergone half of substantive sentence- If the Courts start adopting a rigid approach, in a large number of cases, till the appeal reaches the stage of the final hearing, the accused would undergo the entire sentence. This will be a violation of the rights of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution. Moreover, it will defeat the right of appeal- Clarified Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee representing Undertrial Prisoners vs. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 731. (Para 5-8)
Nur Ahamad Abdulsab Kanavi vs Abdul Munaf 2025 INSC 191 - Motor Accident Compensation - Income - Deceased's Wife Statement
Motor Accident Compensation - Reliance placed on the statement of the deceased’s wife therein to establish the income of the person. (Para 9)
Seema Rani vs Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. 2025 INSC 192 - Motor Accident Compensation- Married Sons & Daughters
Motor Accident Compensation -Major married and earning sons of the deceased, being legal representatives, have a right to apply for compensation, and the Tribunal must consider the application, irrespective of whether the representatives are fully dependent on the deceased or not- There is no reason to exclude a married daughter from compensation. (Para 9-10)
Shyam Prasad Nagalla vs Andhra Pradesh State Board Transport Corporation 2025 INSC 193 - Motor Accident Compensation - Exchange Rate Fixation
Motor Accident Compensation - Date of filing of the claim petition is the proper date for fixing the rate of exchange for computing compensation- The multiplier for a person aged 43 must be 14. No exception is made for a person earning in foreign currency.(Para 9-10)
B.V. Ram Kumar vs State Of Telangana 2025 INSC 194 - S 504 IPC - Senior's Admonition At Workplace
Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 504 - Senior’s admonition cannot be reasonably attributed to mean an ‘intentional insult with the intent to provoke’ within the means of Section 504, IPC, provided that the admonition relates to the matters incidental to the workplace covering discipline and the discharge of duties therein. (Para 28)
Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 504 - Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence does not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC. Furthermore, it would be immaterial that the person who has been insulted and provoked did not actually break the peace or commit any offence (Para 22) -if the accused does not intend to give provocation, the offence is not made out. An insult without an ‘intention to insult’ is not punishable under Section 504, IPC. Further, ‘intentional insult’ must be of such a degree that it has the potential to provoke a reasonable person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. (Para 24)Upon reading the complaint as a whole, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult made by the accused to the complainant so as to provoke the latter to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, then only the act complained of would fall within the ambit of Section 504, IPC. The law does not mandate that the complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking him/her to commit breach of peace or any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which the offending words are used, the person to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504, IPC- whether the person provoked further commits an illegal act or not is immaterial to draw the conclusion of culpability under Section 504, IPC. The ‘intentional insult’ and provocation must be so proximate and close that the accused has either the intention or the knowledge that the intentional insult made by him is likely to cause the provoked person to break public peace or commit some other offence. However, what would be the nature of ‘intentional insult’ causing provocation, to draw culpability under Section 504, IPC would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The test to be applied to determine if the intentional insult made by the accused is sufficient to cause provocation is that of a reasonable person, i.e., if the insult is sufficient to provoke any reasonable person to break peace or commit any other offence, only then the accused will be liable for the offence under Section 504, IPC.
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 482 - In order to entertain a challenge to the FIR, chargesheet or an order taking cognizance, all that has to be seen is, whether from a bare reading of the chargesheet, the ingredients of the sections charged therein are being prima facie made out or not- Constitutional courts are wholly competent to exercise their extraordinary power to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of the justice if the allegations in the FIR or complaint neither disclose the commission of any offence nor make out a prima facie case against the accused. (Para 14)
State Of Uttar Pradesh vs Survendra Kumar @ Sunil Kumar - S 27 Evidence Act - Independent Witness Turns Hostile
Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 27 - If an independent witness turns hostile that does not mean that the evidence in the form of panchnama is to be outright rejected or discarded. The Investigating Officer can definitely prove the contents of the panchanama. 45. However, the law expects the Investigating Officer to prove the contents of the panchnama in accordance with law. It is not just enough for the Investigating Officer to depose that he had drawn the panchnama in the presence of panch witnesses duly signed by the said witnesses and he himself. (Para 44-45)
Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 8 - Howsoever relevant the conduct of the accused may be under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the same is not sufficient to hold the accused guilty of a serious offence like murder. (Para 53)
Criminal Trial - If the evidence of a solitary eye-witness is found to be true, trustworthy and reliable, then it is open for the Court to rely upon the same for the purpose of holding the accused persons guilty of alleged offence. Ordinarily the evidence of a solitary witness can be classified into three categories, (i) wholly reliable (ii) wholly un-reliable and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 36. If the evidence of a solitary eye-witness is found to be wholly reliable, there is no problem in accepting the same, if he is found to be wholly unreliable, the court should discard it in toto. If a situation arises wherein the court finds the evidence of a solitary eye-witness neither wholly reliable nor wholly un-reliable, in such circumstances, the court insists for corroboration in material particulars. (Para 35-36)
Charan Singh vs Ram Saroop - S 96 CPC -Composite Appeal
Code of Civil Procedure - Section 96 - Order XLI Rule 1 - Trial Court dismissed suit and allowed counter claim - Instead of filing two appeals with separate memoranda of appeal, the appellant - plaintiff filed one composite appeal challenging the common judgment and order of the trial court. The first appellate court dismissed the appeal as not maintainable since the appellant had not filed two separate appeals - HC upheld the dismissal - Allowing appeal, SC observed: A composite appeal was not maintainable in law but, at the same time, the first appellate court ought to have borne in mind that courts exist for rendering justice albeit in accordance with law- In terms of Order XLI Rule 1 of the CPC, the appellate court has the power to even dispense with the requirement of law of filing copy of the impugned judgment twice over if it is part of the memorandum of appeal already filed- the court ought to have at least alerted the appellant by making him aware of the requirement of law and giving him the liberty to file a separate memorandum of appeal - If even after being alerted the appellant had failed to file a separate memorandum, the first appellate court would have been perfectly justified in dismissing the appeal- Technicality of a nature such as this should not have been allowed to prevail over substantive justice. (Para 7-8)
