Gulfisha Fatima vs State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2025 INSC 2- Delhi Riots Cases -UAPA - Terrorist Acts- Bail

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Section 43D(5) UAPA

UAPA - Section 43D(5) - Propositions governing the application of Section 43D(5) -First, the provision embodies a deliberate legislative departure from ordinary bail jurisprudence, premised upon the distinctive nature of offences under Chapters IV and VI of the Act. Second, the expression “prima facie true” mandates a threshold judicial inquiry which is neither perfunctory nor adjudicatory, requiring the Court to examine whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses the essential statutory ingredients of the alleged offence. Third, the inquiry is necessarily accused specific, directed to the role and attribution qua the individual, and does not admit of collective or undifferentiated treatment merely because allegations arise from a common transaction or conspiracy. Fourth, the bail stage under Section 43D(5) is not a forum for evaluating defences, weighing evidence, or conducting a minitrial; judicial restraint at this stage is not an abdication of duty but a fulfilment of the statutory mandate. These propositions, read together, define the contours of judicial power and responsibility under the provision.he correct application of Section 43D(5), therefore, requires the Court to undertake a structured inquiry confined to the following: i. whether the prosecution material, accepted as it stands, discloses a prima facie case satisfying the statutory ingredients of the offence alleged; ii. whether the role attributed to the accused reflects a real and meaningful nexus to the unlawful activity or terrorist activity proscribed under the Act, as distinguished from mere association or peripheral presence; and iii. whether the statutory threshold is crossed qua the individual accused, without embarking upon an assessment reserved after fullfledged trial - Where these requirements are met, the statutory restraint on the grant of bail must operate with full force; where they are not, the embargo stands lifted. This approach preserves the legislative purpose of the Act, and ensures that the exceptional nature of the bail regime under Section 43D(5) is neither diluted by overreach nor distorted by mechanical application. (Para 81-82)

Section 15 UAPA

UAPA - Section 15 - “Terrorist act”- The means by which such acts may be committed are not confined to the use of bombs, explosives, firearms, or other conventional weapons alone - To construe Section 15 as limited only to conventional modes of violence would be to unduly narrow the provision, contrary to its plain language - Apart from death or destruction of property, the provision expressly encompasses acts which disrupt supplies or services essential to the life of the community, as well as acts which threaten the economic security of the nation. This reflects Parliament’s recognition that threats to sovereignty and security may arise through conduct that destabilises civic life or societal functioning, even in the absence of immediate physical violence - terrorist activity may involve multiple actors performing different roles towards a common unlawful objective. (Para 86-90)

Constitution of India - Article 21 ; UAPA - Section 43D - In prosecutions alleging offences which implicate the sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State, delay does not operate as a trump card that automatically displaces statutory restraint. Rather, delay serves as a trigger for heightened judicial scrutiny. The outcome of such scrutiny must be determined by a proportional and contextual balancing of legally relevant considerations, including (i) the gravity and statutory character of the offence alleged, (ii) the role attributed to the accused within the alleged design or conspiracy, (iii) the strength of the prima facie case as it emerges at the limited threshold contemplated under the special statute, and (iv) the extent to which continued incarceration, viewed cumulatively in the facts of the case, has become demonstrably disproportionate so as to offend the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21- Thus, when the composite evaluation yields a clear conclusion that continued detention has crossed the bounds of constitutional permissibility that the Court may justifiably intervene notwithstanding statutory restrictions. (Para 56-57) Mere associative proximity, without corresponding evidence demonstrating capacity to exert influence or direction, does not satisfy the threshold required to curtail liberty at the post-investigative stage. (Para 277) seriousness of the allegations, though relevant, does not obviate the constitutional requirement that deprivation of liberty must be necessary for legitimate investigative or trial-related objectives. (Para 35) Gravity of the incidents in question, though serious, cannot eclipse the constitutional demand for individualized assessment of necessity in pre-trial detention. Prolonged incarceration premised solely on the seriousness of allegations, absent a proximate and continuing nexus between the accused and present threats to the administration of justice, would amount to a punitive measure inconsistent with settled principles. (Para 419)

UAPA - Section 43D(5) - The law does not require the prosecution to demonstrate, at the bail stage, that the accused personally caused death or destruction, or personally stocked explosives, before Section 43D(5) can apply. It requires the Court to see whether the material discloses a prima facie case of involvement in the unlawful activity alleged.  (Para 216)

UAPA - Not every disruption of traffic, not every blockade, and not every law-and-order incident engages the statutory framework of the UAPA. The statute is attracted only where the conduct alleged, taken cumulatively, is capable of being understood as threatening the unity, integrity, security, or sovereignty of the nation, or as creating a climate of fear and paralysis transcending ordinary disorder. (Para 227)

UAPA- Gender, while not conferring immunity from criminal law, remains a relevant consideration in determining the necessity of continued pre-trial detention. - The law does not envisage incarceration as a measure of deterrence at the pre-trial stage, particularly where the individual concerned is a woman with no prior criminal antecedents and whose alleged actions stem from a ground-level facilitating role.

Bail - Parity- The plea of parity cannot override the statutory conclusion. Parity is not applied by numerical comparison. It is applied by similarity of role, similarity of attribution, and similarity of the material relied upon. (Para 172)

Constitution of India - Article 19,21 - Dissent and protest occupy a protected space in a constitutional democracy. That protection, however, does not extend to a pleaded design which, if accepted as true, involves systemic disruption, engineered confrontation, and preparatory steps towards violence. (Para 241)

Factual Summary: Delhi Riots Case - Supreme Court declined bail to Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid for their alleged central, planning roles, but granted bail to Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan, and Shadab Ahmed, whose roles were found operational and peripheral, subject to stringent conditions. The Court directed expedited trial, especially examination of protected witnesses, and allowed Imam and Khalid to renew bail after a year or completion of protected-witness testimony.

Case Info

Case: Gulfisha Fatima vs State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi); Neutral citation: 2026 INSC 2; Coram: Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice N.V. Anjaria; Judgment date: January 5, 2026.


Case Details

  • Case name: Gulfisha Fatima vs State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
  • Neutral citation: 2026 INSC 2
  • Coram: Justice Aravind Kumar; Justice N.V. Anjaria
  • Judgment date: January 5, 2026

Caselaws and Citations

  • Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713
  • National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1
  • Vernon v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 8 SCC 1
  • Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 16 SCC 720
  • Athar Parwez v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 124
  • Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 742
  • Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2024) 6 SCC 1
  • CBI v. Dayamoy Mahato, 2025 INSC 1418
  • Union of India v. Saleem Khan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1754
  • Tasleem Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3472
  • Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India, (2022) 14 SCC 766
  • Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135

Statutes/Laws Referred

  • Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
    • Section 15 (terrorist act)
    • Section 18 (conspiracy, attempt, abetment, etc.)
    • Section 43D(5) (bail embargo)
  • Indian Penal Code, 1860
    • Sections 34, 109, 114, 124A, 147, 148, 149, 153A, 186, 201, 212, 295, 302, 307, 341, 353, 395, 420, 427, 435, 436, 452, 454, 468, 471, 120B
  • Arms Act, 1959
    • Sections 25, 27
  • Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984
    • Sections 3, 4
  • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
    • Section 207 (supply of copies to accused)
    • Section 437 (bail)
    • Sections 161, 164 (witness statements)
  • Constitution of India
    • Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty)

Laws Discussed:


Impugned Judgment: